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Abstract  
Internet users are increasingly concerned about their information privacy based on how individuals 
and organisations access and handle personal information. So far, literature has mostly dealt with 
information privacy concerns, referring to how individuals perceive organisational privacy practices, 
or with privacy risks in general. Yet, a deeper understanding is missing regarding the consequences 
individuals perceive to arise from privacy-invasive practices, i.e. the negative outcomes that people 
are afraid of due to an infringement of their privacy. To fill this gap in research, we systematically 
investigate how perceived privacy-invasive data collection and usage can affect individuals. Based on 
our focus group data, we develop a taxonomy of perceived consequences of privacy-invasive 
practices. It consists of six identified categories of consequences, namely social, psychological, 
resource-related, independence-related, legal, and physical consequences, and several privacy-
specific subtypes within these categories.  
Keywords: Information Privacy, Perceived Consequences of Privacy-invasive Practices, Privacy 
Risks, Focus Groups. 
 
1 Introduction 
People in today’s society spend a lot of time with online activities like searching information on the 
internet, shopping online, and interacting with friends in social networks. On the one hand, the internet 
enables comfortable searching and sharing of information and thus has become an integral part of both 
our private and professional lives. On the other hand, all internet users leave numerous data traces that 
contain personal information and reveal details about their behaviour, preferences, and personality. In 
addition to that, most people can be easily identified online, either when they provide required 
information on a voluntary basis, for example in online profiles of social network sites (SNS) or e-
commerce platforms; when they allow cookies to be installed on their computers; or in more unaware 
manner through the combination of several other technical parameters, for example, the operating 
system, the colour depth of their screens, or their Domain Name System profiles (Takeda, 2012). 
Remarkable price erosion for data storage over the last decades combined with technological advances 
in the area of data mining allow the collection, storage, and analysis of large amounts of personal 
information (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012). Companies like Facebook, Google, or Amazon are 
heavily using the so gained knowledge to personalize their service offerings. This way they can better 
address customer interests and increase their profits.  
Internet users are getting increasingly aware of these practices and many surveys constantly show the 
high concerns people voice regarding their privacy in the internet (BCG, 2013; TRUSTe, 2013). 
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Extant research on information privacy has paid a lot of attention to information privacy concerns, 
which  are used as central constructs in comprehensive  literature reviews (Li, 2011; Smith et al., 
2011). Information privacy concerns have been defined as the extent to which an individual is 
concerned about organisational practices of handling personal information (Smith et al, 1996). Many 
studies have found that information privacy concerns influence users’ willingness to disclose personal 
information (Smith et al., 2011). Yet, other studies have shown that while people express serious 
concerns, they still often disclose significant amount of their personal information on the internet 
(Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005; Jensen et al., 2005; Norberg et al., 2007).  
In this paper, we argue that we need a better understanding of what people perceive the impact of 
privacy-invasive practices to be. This is a necessary basis for gaining deeper insight into the 
relationship between perceptions of privacy, perceptions of consequences of privacy invasions, and 
actual behaviour. The concepts of information privacy concerns and privacy-protective responses are 
well defined in extant literature. Information privacy concerns examine people’s perceptions on how 
organisations handle personal information, that is, whether they collect, analyse, use, and forward 
people’s personal information, constituting potential privacy-invasive practices. Privacy-invasive 
practices describe the ways personal information might be handled by organisations or by other third 
parties so that a person’s privacy is infringed. Son and Kim (2008) identified several privacy-
protective responses that people might use when their privacy was invaded, including refusal of 
information provision, misrepresentation of information, or spread of negative word-of-mouth about 
the organisation. However, Dinev (2014) argues that people might have a limited knowledge and 
understanding of these privacy-invasive practices and how they impact individuals; in other words, 
what consequences can arise for individuals out of these privacy-invasive practices. Drawing on this, 
we think it is important to develop a systematic understanding of how privacy-invasive practices by 
individuals or organisations impact people. This is needed to better understand privacy-related 
behaviour: both information privacy concerns regarding organizational data handling and the 
consequences they perceive for themselves might shape people’s behavioural reactions. 
One concept used in literature is privacy risk. Risks in general can be described as a function of 
adverse consequences and uncertainty (Bauer, 1960). More specifically, privacy risks refer to the 
expected privacy loss and are defined as the “perceived risk of opportunistic behavior related to the 
disclosure of personal information submitted by Internet users in general” (Dinev and Hart, 2006, 
p.64). However, earlier privacy research describes privacy risks as one-dimensional and they are often 
investigated merely as the loss of control or the overall perceived risk (Malhotra et al., 2004; Dinev 
and Hart, 2006; Smith et al., 2011). In other contexts, risk has been found to consist of several 
categories, including for example social, psychological, or financial categories (Dowling, 1986). These 
can also be seen to apply to the context of privacy. For instance, due to privacy invasions, people 
could lose money if their credit card data is misused. This is a financial risk. Also, people might be 
concerned about a constant surveillance of their behaviour on the internet and a potential loss of their 
peace of mind. This is a psychological risk. Therefore, our aim is to investigate privacy risks in detail 
and identify their categories. More specifically, our focus is on one risk component, namely the 
adverse consequences. While consequences describe the form of a loss from privacy invasion, the 
second risk component, uncertainty, describes the probability of a consequence’s occurrence. 
Therefore, it is subjective and situational by nature and not identifiable in general (Dowling, 1986). 
Even more, we have to get a clear understanding of the consequences first before we can investigate 
their likelihood. The overall idea of investigating privacy risks is also supported by Preibusch (2013) 
who calls for the development of new concepts in addition to information privacy concerns to enhance 
our understanding of the antecedents of online behaviour. 
Based on the above discussion and argumentation, we see the investigation of perceived consequences 
of privacy-invasive practices highly relevant and increasingly important. Thus, we pose the following 
research question:  
What are the perceived consequences of privacy-invasive practices? 
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With this research question, we look into how people perceive potential privacy invasions by both 
known and unknown individuals and organisations (commercial and non-commercial). We will 
introduce a taxonomy of perceived consequences of privacy-invasive behaviour in the internet, 
thereby not limiting our study to one context but incorporating all types of perceived consequences 
that are of relevance in the internet. This helps to advance both theoretical and practical understanding 
of how internet users’ privacy perceptions influence their behaviour.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next chapter, we give an overview on 
information privacy concerns and privacy risks and thereby build the foundation for our study. In the 
third chapter, we describe our methodology. We used focus groups to gather detailed insights into 
perceived consequences of privacy-invasive behaviour. We then discuss our findings and finish by 
highlighting theoretical and practical contributions of our research as well as directions for future 
research. 
2 Earlier research 
While there are several definitions of information privacy, they all have one thing in common, namely 
that they typically “include some form of control over the potential secondary uses of one’s personal 
information” (Bélanger and Crossler, 2011). We adopt the well-established definition of Westin 
(1967) who also includes the control element by referring to information privacy as the “claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others” (p.7). In the following, we discuss the concepts of 
information privacy concerns and privacy risks as they are used in privacy research. We also discuss 
their limitations in explaining the adverse consequences of privacy-invasive practices for people. 
2.1 Information privacy concerns 
Information privacy concerns refer to the worries or anxieties that people associate with a potential 
loss of privacy (Bansal et al., 2010). They are used as proxy for information privacy and have evolved 
as the central construct in privacy research over the last years (Smith et al., 2011; Li, 2011). Especially 
the conceptualisations of Smith et al. (1996) and Malhotra et al. (2004) have received considerable 
attention and have served as basis for many studies. 
Smith et al. (1996) conducted the first methodologically rigorous approach to analyse information 
privacy concerns and argue that they are multi-dimensional. They call the according instrument 
“Concern For Information Privacy (CFIP)”. Information privacy concerns have traditionally been 
investigated as being one-dimensional, but often varied from study to study and without a common 
underlying framework (Smith et al., 1996). Smith et al. (1996) identified four central categories of 
information privacy concerns: 
 collection, referring to the “concern that extensive amounts of personally identifiable data are 
being collected and stored in databases” (p.172);  
 internal or external unauthorized secondary usage, describing the “concern that information is 
collected from individuals for one purpose but is used for another, secondary purpose, (eventually 
even) after disclosure to an external party” (p.172);  
 improper access, being defined as the “concern that data about individuals are readily available to 
people not properly authorized to view or work with this data” (p.172), and  
 errors, comprising the “concern that protections against deliberate and accidental errors in 
personal data are inadequate” (p.172).  
The taxonomy categorises individuals’ concerns about organisational information privacy practices 
(Smith et al., 1996) and has mostly been applied in offline or traditional direct marketing settings 
(Malhotra et al., 2004). While it focuses on how individuals perceive organisational behaviour 
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regarding the handling of personal information, it ignores the impacts of these perceived 
organisational information handling practices on individuals.  
Malhotra et al. (2004) build on the work of Smith et al. (1996) and extend it to an online setting. 
Drawing from social contract theory, they define information privacy concerns as “an individual’s 
subjective views of fairness within the context of information privacy” (p.337) and identify three 
categories, namely collection, control, and awareness. Their instrument “Internet Users’ Information 
Privacy Concerns (IUIPC)” is conceptualized as “the degree to which an Internet user is concerned 
about online marketers’ collection of personal information, the user’s control over the collected 
information, and the user’s awareness of how the collected information is used” (p.338). Similar to 
CFIP, IUIPC does not pay attention to the impacts of organisational behaviour on individuals, even 
though the category of control could be interpreted this way. Overall, IUIPC was also developed for e-
commerce settings.  
In contexts other than e-commerce, information privacy concerns are understood and used similarly. 
Hong and Thongh (2013) found users to have lower concerns regarding disclosure of information to 
governmental websites than to commercial websites. Yet, the expectations of how their data should be 
handled were the same in both settings. The same is true for privacy studies in the context of social 
networking. For instance, Chen et al. (2009) investigated information privacy concerns related to what 
peers disclose about friends: They looked into the practices of unauthorized use, improper access, and 
error. Neither of these studies on information privacy concerns considers how an individual might be 
impacted by privacy-invasive practices of other individuals or organisations.  
2.2 Privacy risks 
The concept of risk has its root in psychology research and has received much attention in consumer 
behaviour research. Risk is most commonly defined as comprising the severity of negative 
consequences of a situation and their probability of occurrence. However, the probabilities might be 
unknown and just refer to a good or bad feeling that influences the perceived subjective risk a person 
assigns to a potential outcome of a situation (Cunningham, 1967; Jacoby and Kaplan, 1972; Dowling, 
1986; Mitchell, 1999).  
The categories of risk have been widely debated. Earlier research has identified various types of 
losses, even though little consensus has been reached regarding their precise nature. Studies have used 
different categories depending on the context and the object under investigation. Yet, most often the 
following categories have been of interest and have been incorporated in research (Dowling, 1986):  
 Performance risk which refers to whether the outcome is of the expected quality. 
 Social risk which refers to whether the outcome leads to an individual’s embarrassment in 
one’s social group. 
 Physical risk which refers to whether the outcome influences the individual’s safety. 
 Financial risk which refers to whether there is a monetary outlay associated with the outcome. 
 Psychological risk which refers to whether an individual’s peace of mind is affected. 
The risk concept comprising these different types has proved useful for example in consumer 
behaviour research (Featherman and Pavlou, 2003; Luo et al., 2010a). In privacy research, however, 
the concept of risk has been treated in an inadequate manner. Privacy risks are often used as part of the 
privacy calculus perspective that assumes that a trade-off between risks and benefits determines users’ 
behaviour. In this perspective, privacy risks have so far been assumed to be one-dimensional 
(Malhotra et al., 2004; Dinev and Hart, 2006; Smith et al., 2011). Dinev and Hart (2006) identified 
that these risks arise from different types of organisational actions, such as, unauthorized access and 
disclosure of personal information or improper access by hackers, third parties, or governmental 




Twenty-Third European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Münster, Germany, 2015 5 
 
 
agencies. However, again the impact of privacy-invasive practices on the individual is not taken into 
detailed consideration. Smith et al. (1996) state that an individual’s calculation of risks “involves an 
assessment of the likelihood of negative consequences as well as the perceived severity of those 
consequences (and that the) negative perceptions related to risk may affect an individual emotionally, 
materially, and physically” (p.1001). Yet, to our best knowledge none of the existing privacy risk 
conceptualisations follow this line of thought rigorously, nor do they investigate different categories of 
privacy risks. 
3 Methodology 
In the empirical context of our study, we conducted focus group interviews as our qualitative data 
collection method to better understand the types of individually perceived consequences of privacy-
invasive practices. We invited several participants to discuss a specific topic of interest to the 
researchers and to provide their insights into their attitudes, perceptions, and opinions (Bélanger, 
2012). In our case, focus groups were a suitable methodology as they allowed us to explore how 
privacy-invasive practices affect individuals. The focus group discussions entailed rich interaction 
among the participants, as they had to explain their opinions and provide good argumentation.  
Based on Fern’s (2001) classification of focus group method types, we chose the exploratory type. The 
purpose of exploratory focus groups is to identify, collect, and explain feelings, thoughts, and 
behaviour. It aims at uncovering everyday knowledge and at making it explicit to generate theoretical 
constructs, causal relationships, and theories. In comparison, experiential focus groups can be used to 
triangulate and confirm hypotheses and theories while clinical focus groups are used to explain 
feelings and behaviour that are suppressed or unknown to individuals but influence their preferences 
(Fern, 2001).  
The decision to collect empirical evidence with exploratory focus groups guided the design and 
conduct of our focus groups. We followed the guidelines provided by Fern (2001) and used 
heterogeneous participants with respect to their privacy attitudes and knowledge about privacy-
invasive practices for uncovering not only shared but also unique ideas. However, within each focus 
group, we chose homogeneous individuals with respect to their social environment and age. Due to the 
sensitivity of the topic, we expected individuals to disclose their feelings and perceptions more openly 
in a familiar environment. We also relied on Fern’s (2001) guidance on the duration of sessions and 
number of participants. The latter one follows the same logic as with other qualitative methods: once 
saturation is reached and no new concepts and ideas emerge, one should stop gathering further data.  
Altogether, we conducted seven focus groups: three with pupils, three with students, and one with 
adults, thereby putting the focus on younger subjects. Those individuals are digital natives who have 
intertwined the use of digital technologies with their daily lives (Vodanovich et al., 2010). They are 
especially suitable for identifying perceived consequences as they are constantly exposed to various 
online activities. Yet, our focus groups also showed that they critically reflect on privacy issues. 
Moreover, the focus groups with adults did not reveal any additional consequences compared to the 
focus groups with students and pupils. Table 1 gives an overview of all focus groups conducted. Each 
focus group was recoded and transcribed. The focus group moderator used a semi-structured interview 
guideline to start the discussion but then was very open to different directions the discussions could 
take and flexibly adapted the moderation to explore new and unexpected ideas. In particular, the 
participants were asked about activities they (do not) perform regularly in the internet and which 
information they (do not) share. Then, all activities in which personal information is knowingly or 
unknowingly shared were investigated in detail. This improved our understanding of the participants’ 
behaviour, their concerns regarding privacy-invasive practices, and whether they perceived any impact 
of those practices. Moreover, the groups also discussed which information is sensitive and how to 
manage their privacy. 
 









Description Number of  
participants 
Age range Duration 
F1 Students of a German university (bachelor and 
master program) 
5 21 to 25 1 hour 40 minutes 
F2 Students of a German university (bachelor and 
master program) 
5 22 to 24 1 hour 40 minutes 
F3 Students of a German university (bachelor and 
master program) 
4 22 to 24 1 hour 40 minutes 
F4 Pupils of 11
th
 grade of a German high school 8 17 to 18 1 hour 30 minutes 
F5 Group of German adults 5 24 to 43 45 minutes 
F6 Pupils of 8
th
 grade of a German high school 6 13 to 14 40 minutes 
F7 Pupils of 10
th
 grade of a German high school 10 15 to 16 1 hour 15 minutes 
Table 1. Focus groups  
For data analysis, we coded the data using Atlas.ti
1
. We started with coding low-level concepts and 
phenomena and then build categories by putting together similar related concepts. Based on constant 
comparison of the data “to see if [the focus groups] support and continue to support the emerging 
categories” (Holton, 2007, p.277), we identified categories of perceived consequences of privacy-
invasive practices and were able to summarize those concepts into higher level categories of 
consequences. Thus, our approach used the focus group participants’ experiences with information 
privacy to develop a second-order theoretical understanding of perceived consequences of privacy-
invasive practices (Lee, 1991; Sarker et al., 2012). Our approach can be described as a less procedural 
version of the grounded theory methodology as proposed by Sarker and Sarker (2009).  
4 Results  
In the following, we present our results and interpretations of individuals’ perceived consequences of 
privacy-invasive practices. We start with a short summary of privacy-invasive practices. We then 
investigate in detail how these practices can impact individuals and develop a taxonomy that 
summarizes our findings.  
4.1 Privacy-invasive practices 
In order to understand which consequences individuals see as a result of privacy-invasive practices, it 
is first of all important to understand how one’s privacy can be invaded. As explained in chapter 2, 
Smith et al. (1996) discuss four categories of organisational practices that could give rise to 
information privacy concerns. Those categories are collection, unauthorized usage, improper access, 
and errors. Our focus group participants named all of those practices as well, even though they did not 
only relate them to a commercial organisational context, but also elaborated on how individuals and 
governmental agencies might invade their privacy. The same categories apply. 
To give an example regarding collection, one participant said:  
“I think the biggest problem is if you own an Android smartphone and also use other Google services, 
then Google has an almost complete life story of you. It has complete location information of your 
whole life since you own an Android smartphone, a complete search history, not only based on your 
IP but eventually under your name, if you have a Google-account. (…) They know everything about 
you.” (participant in F3) 
                                                     
1 We used Atlas.ti version 7.5.2 for coding our data. 
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In this case, it is not just the information one knowingly shares with an organisation, but he also hints 
at the unconscious constant data collection that happens. 
Regarding errors, one participant told that she was afraid of other individuals spreading wrong 
information about her: 
“For me, sensitive data would also comprise that someone starts a rumour about me. I would be 
really mad, especially if it is wrong, if it is just not true, and I’ll find it out or it is has been posted via 
a social media platform and thus can hardly be removed.”(participant in F2) 
Improper access has often been named with respect to organisations that display advertisements 
based on individuals’ search history they took from other sources or with respect to individual hackers 
that are interested in account and credit card information: 
“Lately, I’ve searched for a cap via Google. I just googled it and picked one I liked and saved it in my 
favourites. Then I went to Facebook and the exactly same cap was offered to me at the side 
banner.”(participant in F4) 
“I’m more afraid of hackers or other single persons who might be interested in students and could do 
a lot of harm. (…) I don’t think that Google would sell my account information. I’m not afraid of that. 
I’m more afraid of hackers who might get access to my data and misuse them for something I dislike.” 
(participant in F1) 
Lastly, unauthorized secondary usage of information has again often been mentioned in an 
organisational context, for example for marketing purposes, but also in private settings. One 
participant told that she often went to parties with friends and then the following happened: 
“A friend of mine and me, we made strange pictures and it was really funny, we had a lot of fun. Yet 
no one has to know of that. But she uploaded one of those pictures as her cover photo. I found that 
really terrible and it took me a lot of time to convince her to undo that (…). The bad thing is that if 
something like this happens, it’ll never be forgotten, as I said in the beginning.”(participant in F4) 
To sum up, all different categories that we already know from literature have also been identified by 
our focus group participants. Even more, we found support that those practices can also be executed 
not only by organisations but also by individuals. We can now build on those practices to investigate 
the related perceived consequences and the effect they have on individuals.  
4.2 Perceived consequences of privacy-invasive practices 
Based on our focus groups, we identified six categories of consequences, namely social, 
independence-related, resource-related, legal, psychological, and physical consequences. They depict 
different ways of how individuals can be impacted by privacy-invasive practices. More specifically, 
they describe how individuals can perceive to be negatively affected by practices such as collection, 
the unauthorized usage, the improper access, and errors of personal information. Those practices per 
se do not have to harm individuals. However, negative outcomes might arise from those practices 
which we refer to as consequences of privacy-invasive practices. We develop a taxonomy that 
summarizes those results. The taxonomy is summarized in Figure 1 in chapter 4.3 and the categories 
are introduced in detail in the following. 
4.2.1 Social consequences 
Social consequences comprise all fears about a change in social status as a result of privacy-invasive 
practices. Three different types of social consequences can be differentiated. First, others might do a 
prejudged evaluation of an individual based on the information that someone gathered online. This 
could be an impression one gets from the information available in SNS, for example from status 
messages, pictures, profile information, or likes with which someone expresses that he or she is fond 
of something or someone. Another source of information is publicly available information that can be 
found via search engines. As a consequence of access to this information, others develop an idea of the 
opinions and the behaviour of an individual. If individuals dislike this pigeonhole thinking and are 
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worried about the impression that others now have of them, then an individual is bothered by a 
prejudged evaluation: 
“I‘ve lately googled myself. The first hit I got was a comment about American beer I made in some 
forum during the time of the soccer world cup in 2006. I said that it tastes like piss (at a time I was 15 
and thus not even officially allowed to drink alcohol). When I saw that I thought ‘seriously‘? (…) This 
shouldn‘t be the first hit someone gets about me on the internet.” And further on he said: “When I 
think back how I behaved five years ago, I don‘t want others to see that now. I want to freely develop 
myself, without being put into a stereotype for the next years.“ (participant in F1) 
A related idea was raised by another participant:  
“The problem with pictures is that you only see a detail of a scene, but you don’t know what happened 
before or after and in consequence, you sometimes appear in a bad light.” (participant in F7) 
Second, a loss of respectability is a further social consequence. It occurs if in addition to a negatively 
perceived image others subjectively condemn certain behaviour, independent of whether it is actually 
questionable: 
“Another problem is that one could lose respectability. (…) When I google teachers of mine or enter 
them into Facebook, then you’ll get pictures. For one teacher, I got the information that she got an eye 
treatment by laser surgery (…) in Istanbul, and I think this is so highly dubious, so that I thought “oh 
ok”. And for another teacher, you’ll get some strange pictures. Once you’ve seen them, you cannot 
look at him without thinking “ah, ok”.” (participant in F7) 
Third, calumny and mobbing describe another subcategory of social consequences that individuals 
can be afraid of. Based on opinions, pictures, or other available information, people could be harassed: 
“Via Whatsapp, I only send pictures to people who I really trust, especially the ugly ones. I know, 
when I post them into this group, they won’t be passed on to others. What happens in this group stays 
in this group, to say it. On Facebook, there is the danger of cyber mobbing and stupid comments, I just 
want to avoid that. I don’t want to be exposed to that.” (participant in F7) 
In addition, people might also fear that others spread misinformation to harm someone:   
“For me, sensitive data would also comprise if someone starts a rumour about me. I would be really 
mad, especially if it is wrong, it’s just not true, and I’ll find it out or it is has been posted via a social 
media platform and thus can hardly be removed.” (participant in F2) 
4.2.2 Independence-related consequences 
Independence-related consequences refer to the fear of manipulation as a result of privacy-invasive 
practices. In particular, they present one way of how personal information can be abused. Individuals 
might perceive that they no longer have a free choice of how to behave and what to believe in because 
they might only be confronted with predetermined and selected pieces of information, not the whole 
unfiltered flow of information. Two different types of manipulation could occur. Individuals can fear 
that either their behaviour or their opinion is aim of the manipulation. Based on personal information 
that organisations collect and analyse, they get a good idea about people’s habits, preferences, and 
opinions. However, if organisations have knowledge on these aspects, they might try to manipulate a 
person’s behaviour. Personalized advertisements are one form of manipulation intentions:  
“Everyone knows that you get personalized advertisements in the internet, e.g. based on what you just 
looked at. But how much can they manipulate with these data? How much do we realize? We‘ll never 
know how much it influences us. Would I have bought a certain product anyway or have I bought it 
only due to the manipulation?“ (participant in F7) 
Regarding a manipulation of a person’s opinion, a perceived consequence deals with governmental 
agencies that might be interested in censoring information:  
“If I submit a Google search query, then they save my whole history. If they then want to manipulate 
which information I can see about current topics, then it’ll be possible to heavily censor that. Thus, we 
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again address the topic of governments. If somehow a government might either put pressure on 
Google or offers incentives to Google to censor something or to manipulate the opinions of certain 
people, then I perceive that as really dangerous.” (participant in F3) 
4.2.3 Resource-related consequences 
We define resource-related consequences as the fear of a loss of resources due to privacy-invasive 
practices. Two types of resource-related consequences can be differentiated: financial and time-related 
losses. Financial losses are especially associated with an improper access of account information, for 
example by third parties that hack into an account:  
“Regarding online shopping, my biggest concern is that my account information is stolen and that 
huge amounts of money are debited. (…) The risk is there. This is always in the back of my mind.“ 
(participant in F3) 
A loss of time has also been identified as consequence. For example, e-mail addresses are misused and 
spam mails are constantly sent that an individual has to deal with. Another interesting example was 
given by a student. She described that she disclosed her cell phone number in a lottery and now 
constantly gets called by various unknown numbers:  
“On the internet, it is said that this are rip-off artists who want to sell some holiday offers. If I don’t 
answer them, nothing will happen to me. However, they probably want to get more data about me, I 
don’t know. I always block their numbers, when they are using a new one. Then, I google it to check 
who that could be, and it always says that this aren’t reputable callers.” (participant in F3) 
Moreover, she told that she already tried to find out who was responsible for the lottery and went 
through all her e-mails without any result. Overall, she is investing a lot of time to solve this hassle. 
4.2.4 Legal consequences 
Legal consequences refer to the fear of being made responsible for actions someone did in another 
person’s name and thus misused the person’s identity. Individuals are then worried that the identity is 
used to commit fraud or other crimes and that they might be held liable for that. A student told that her 
e-mail account got hacked and she was worried about the following: 
“But my biggest concerns were that someone commits with my e-mail address, in my name, fraud. 
That he sends offers to others that I’m hold liable for.” (participant in F3) 
4.2.5 Psychological consequences 
Psychological consequences comprise all types of fear that an individual’s peace of mind is negatively 
affected as a result of privacy-invasive practices. It means that those practices are constantly present in 
an individual’s mind so that the individual perpetually thinks about it and thus is under constant 
psychological pressure. We identify four types of psychological consequences. First, individuals can 
have a constant feeling of surveillance. They are afraid that every single action they do in the internet 
is monitored and analysed which puts a major burden on them and an uneasy feeling. For example, 
one focus group discussed about Anonymous, a loosely associated international network of activist 
and hacktivist entities:  
 “Yes those guys with the masks. I like what they do and it‘s important. But I didn‘t dare to like them 
on Facebook, even though I‘d love to get their news in my newsfeed. I mean, I don‘t know who might 
get to know about that and how that could fall back negatively on me. I don‘t know whether this is an 
unjustified fear, but it is strange and I behave totally different, only due to this constant feeling of 
surveillance.“ (participant in F4) 
Moreover, friends and acquaintances can also be a source of surveillance fears:  
“What happened often to me is that my sister and my friends tagged me everywhere. Well, I didn’t like 
that. (…) It is an unwell feeling when other people know where you are.”(participant in F5) 
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Second, individuals can perceive a pressure of constant mindfulness and attentiveness as to which 
information they share. They have the impression that they constantly have to evaluate and critically 
analyse their online behaviour in order to identify all potential harmful consequences of this behaviour 
that could occur in the future:  
“I often think about the following issue: In your youth, everyone makes mistakes and those mistakes 
might of course be also visible via Facebook or via the internet in general. If our parents made 
something stupid, then it was forgotten five years later. For us, it is theoretically, or not only 
theoretically, the possibility really exists, that it’ll again surface in 40 years, once a stupid picture got 
published, whether you wanted that or not and whether you thought about it thoroughly or not. This is 
really frightening and restricts my freedom of what I’d like to do. Every time, I have to fully evaluate 
how to present myself and what I do online. It’s a pity because in your youth, you should have fun and 
so on, but that is how it is.” (participant in F4) 
Another psychological consequence is a feeling of a loss of control. Once information has been 
shared, individuals might perceive that they can no longer decide on who has access to their 
information and how their information is used. The loss of control can bother people so that it is 
constantly in their mind. It leads to stress and a mental burden due to the perceived helplessness and 
powerlessness:  
“Just recently the issue emerged that all pictures which we upload and everything that we write could 
be used for advertisements and similar things. I was really scared when I heard of the possibility that 
my profile picture could be displayed on a poster two days later somewhere in the city.” (participant 
in F4) 
It can also be a perceived loss of control, where control could be gained back with high effort: 
“What really bothered me is that Facebook-Apps just make things public without asking whether that 
is alright for the user. Perhaps it’s written down in small print which I usually don’t check. For 
example, I pledged for an orchestral work on Kickstarter, so that it can be performed, and I would get 
the recording. The work was called “Totmorden”, which is a rather polarizing term for Germans and 
which you do not want to be associated with your name if a potential employer is checking you out on 
the web. (…) And if you googled my name, you could see that I pledged for their project, which I 
didn’t find cool.” (participant in F3) 
Lastly, individuals can also have a general feeling of uncertainty as a diffuse, abstract threat. They 
currently do not see any specific consequences. Yet they are afraid that at some point in time there 
could be negative consequences and this issue already impacts their peace of mind:  
“An extreme example: I’ve googled the basics of Scientology or (Hitler’s) “Mein Kampf” because I 
was interested in it. I also read several other books, but you wouldn’t want this to appear alone, that 
you read something like that. Just because you might be interested in it from a historical perspective. 
It’s really totally harmless. If you take all books that you’ve read at some point in time and in which 
you are interested, then you’ll get an innocent impression of me. (…) There is a feeling of unease, even 
though it doesn’t make any sense, as they already know everything about you. So this fear is not really 
rational, but I have this bad feeling when I do certain things on the internet.” (participant in F3) 
4.2.6 Physical consequences 
Physical consequences refer to the fear of a loss of physical safety as result of privacy-invasive 
practices. If personal information is easily available online, it can be used to find out where a person 
stays. For example, if a person had an argument with someone or if others want to punish a person, 
e.g. for certain behaviour or an opinion, the availability of location information can lead to physical 
violence against that person: 
“Once I was threatened by someone via Facebook. I was really extremely glad that I hadn’t published 
any sensitive data online. I was really scared because if my city and my real name had been available, 
it wouldn’t have been too difficult to identify and find me in a city not too big.” (participant in F2) 
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4.3 Taxonomy of perceived consequences of privacy-invasive practices 
 
Figure 1 summarizes our results and graphically depicts our preliminary taxonomy. We developed this 
taxonomy based on the data from our focus groups. It consists of the six categories physical, social, 























Figure 1. Taxonomy of perceived consequences of privacy-invasive practices 
Our taxonomy is a first approach towards categorizing perceived consequences of privacy-invasive 
practices. We believe this taxonomy helps to better understand how privacy-invasive practices and the 
way individuals perceive them affect individuals. 
5 Discussion 
The main purpose of this study was to advance theoretical understanding of information privacy. We 
developed a taxonomy of perceived consequences of privacy-invasive practices and classified the 
impact individuals expect due to these practices into six categories. In addition to recognizing that 
these practices affect individuals it is important to understand what different types of consequences 
individuals can perceive.  
Our results have several theoretical implications. So far, privacy research has focused on information 
privacy concerns, meaning how individuals perceive organisations to handle their data, and on privacy 
risks in terms of the expected loss of privacy. However, privacy risk has been conceptualized as a 
single-dimensional construct, focusing on the overall risk perception. None of the earlier studies have 
fully captured how individuals perceive the ways an invasion of their privacy could harm them. By 
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investigating how privacy-invasive practices affect individuals, we aimed at filling this gap. The focus 
of our investigation was on one component of risk: the adverse consequences. These adverse 
consequences have to be understood before the second risk component - a subjective likelihood of the 
consequence’s occurrence – can be evaluated. We offer insights into the consequences individuals 
might perceive to occur when their privacy is invaded by other individuals or organisations. We found 
six categories of consequences, namely social, psychological, resource-related, independence-related, 
physical, and legal consequences. Even though four of the identified high-level categories are in line 
with earlier literature, our taxonomy introduces novel privacy-specific forms of those consequences. 
They are different from risk categories in other areas, such as e-commerce. For instance, psychological 
risks in earlier literature have been referred to as the risks “that the service will lower the consumer’s 
self image” (Luo et al., 2010, p.226). However, this type of risk does not seem to play a major role in 
privacy. We found evidence for other forms of psychological consequences in privacy, namely the 
mental stress that people experience when having to decide whether or not to disclose certain 
information because there could be negative consequences associated with this decision. Another form 
is the constant feeling of surveillance that is also very specific for privacy. Thus, although the overall 
categories of consequences are similar on an aggregated level, the particular instantiations can vary 
widely for several categories. Moreover, we found two categories, namely legal and independence-
related consequences, which are specific to a privacy context.  
Our taxonomy can also be used as a helpful classification tool when only specific consequences are 
taken into consideration. Since the earlier conceptualisations of information privacy concerns and 
privacy risks offer only limited explanation of online user information disclosure behaviour, we 
believe that the viewpoint of perceived consequences of privacy-invasive practices can be an 
interesting new perspective on this topic.  
Our results also offer implications for practice. Our insights into how privacy-invasive practices can 
impact online users can help organisations to analyse which of these consequences arise from their 
practices and how they can be influenced and possibly also mitigated. In addition, some consequences 
might be linked to certain parties, for example social consequences mostly arise from privacy-invasive 
behaviour of individuals or psychological consequences such as a constant feeling of surveillance can 
be traced to governmental agencies. Recognizing and mitigating these consequences is the 
responsibility of relevant authorities.  
6 Conclusion and outlook 
Many studies in privacy research have focused on information privacy concerns. While it is important 
to understand how individuals perceive organisational privacy-invasive practices, so far research has 
neglected how these practices can impact individuals. Yet, without a systematic and holistic 
understanding of these perceived consequences it is difficult to understand how individuals are 
affected by privacy-invasive practices. Our taxonomy of perceived consequences of privacy-invasive 
practices sheds light on these issues by categorizing the consequences that can be perceived to affect 
individuals if their privacy is invaded.  
Nevertheless, more research on this area is clearly needed. We see several directions for future 
research on privacy: First, it would be useful to understand in more detail the types of perceived 
consequences in different contexts - for example SNS, e-commerce and information search - and the 
sources of the different consequences. It would also be interesting to better understand which factors 
influence the perceived consequences of privacy-invasive practices and whether and how they can be 
mitigated. 
Moreover, our taxonomy can serve as basis for the development of new scales of measurement for 
empirical studies on privacy risk as multi-dimensional construct. As the impact of those practices on 
individuals has not yet been investigated in privacy research, it is necessary to develop new research 
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instruments. However, since other areas like consumer behaviour research have already investigated 
risk as multi-dimensional concept, it might be helpful to build on those scales wherever possible.  
Finally, a promising avenue for future research would be to test whether and how perceived 
consequences of privacy-invasive practices influence actual online user behaviour. Our focus group 
participants mentioned that they behave differently if the consequences are severe and likely to occur. 
Yet, there might be a certain threshold that has to be reached before behavioural changes can be 
noticed. This is also of interest to practice. Many business models like those of SNS providers or e-
commerce platforms depend on the collection and analysis of user data. It is of crucial importance for 
these organizations to understand online users’ information privacy concerns and consequent 
information disclosure behaviour. 
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